

Chief, HE

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1. Upon reading the Field Project Outline transmitted under Reference, I was reminded of our recent conversation concerning the need for KUCAGE officers to spend full time in their assignment on such activities and to plan for new KUCAGE activities which could be implemented at the appropriate time. I consider the reference attempt to crystallize the pertinent conclusions on the past, present and future of this Project as indicative of the type of effort expected of a KUCAGE officer. I make this statement fully recognizing that a number of interested persons within KIBARK may not agree fully with the presentation contained in the LOGASSOCK Project Outline and may even take strong issue with some of the specific statements. I personally regard the limitations of this outline, insofar as higher echelon thinking may not be fully reflected, as a result of the inadequate communication between Headquarters and the Field on detailed KUCAGE policy. Please note that I'm not blaming anyone for this inadequacy of communication and fully recognize that a great deal of the thought and discussion which go into Headquarters position papers simply cannot be made available to the Field Case Officer. Consequently, when the latter is instructed to write a Field Project Outline, he must rely upon such policy as is available to him and such estimates of the situation as can be pulled together at the time. Even so I'm struck by the similarity of []'s estimate and recommendations for future KUCAGE activity with observations that I heard expressed by the KUCAGE Staff and the HE Division Staff when I was on TDY in Washington last spring. I would, insofar as I'm able, like to expand upon this similarity of thinking in the following paragraphs.

2. While the terminology used in the Field Project Outline differs considerably from that utilized by the Headquarters Staffers, it seems to me that both quite clearly endorse two basic principles for KUCAGE activities. The first of these is the concept that, within the limitations placed upon our activities by the OFFICE policy of avoiding general war on one hand and supporting the Host

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Government policy to the greatest extent possible on the other hand, we are left with the objective of reducing and eliminating the Communist threat by a process of evolution away from the rigid one-world Communism of Stalin, through a series of intermediate stages of Communism/Socialism, to the point where "democratic" governments will eventually be formed in the Satellites and presumably at some date also in the Soviet Union. I understand that there are several basic policy papers to this effect available in Headquarters although I personally never did get around to reading them.

3. The second basic principle which I gleaned from various conversations is somewhat allied to the first and could be over-simply stated as putting the "psychological" back into psychological warfare. This concept recognized that because of the changes within the Soviet Bloc, the direct blunt attack on Communism as a totalitarian, terroristic, and undemocratic form of government would have to be replaced by varied, more subtle and indirect campaigns. Certainly in the Spring of 1956, de-Stalinization, despite our continuing propagandistic attempts to debunk it, signified the removal of a key symbol which had been continually attacked. Stalin's removal, voluntarily declared by the CPUSA, meant automatically that new targets would have to be suggested, analyzed, and attacked, usually less directly because of the possibility that some of the audience might see some inherent good in these new targets or also possibly that these new targets, if properly approached, might develop in accordance with the first stated principle of evolution away from imperialist Communism.

4. The attitude of the Western and "free" worlds also had to be considered increasingly. Even though the Cold War continued, it too became a shapeworn symbol and anti-Communism had to be disguised and coated with new meanings to be acceptable, particularly in socialist and pacifist circles. Despite Hungary, this trend has not been revised. CACERY operations were further complicated by the restoration of Fedrep sovereignty in May 1955 which automatically required a re-appraisal of our former "Occupation" mentality.

5. All of these thoughts are restated in different words in the LOCASOCK Field Project Outline. Furthermore, the experience under this project is a repetition of groping for, testing and identifying a number of approaches to the achievement of our operational objectives other than the straight political outcry against Communism which characterized so many of our efforts in the past years. I certainly do not wish to imply that such developments have not been undertaken in other projects or in other areas as well. Certainly, our own experiences in CACERY and other projects have been similar. However, I feel that LOCASOCK, because we have used it as a kind of psychological warfare workshop to test ideas and to experiment, has as a result developed a body of thinking which has already proved useful and will be increasing so in the future. Unfortunately, we have not

been able to translate and comment on all the various experiments in dispatches because of other priorities. Presumably even if we had, few persons in higher echelons would have had the time to read all the traffic. As a result again of the lack of adequate communication, LOJASSON was over simplified as a falsified magazine project employing gimmicks and many of the outstanding efforts such as Tunnel Gabb are lost in the shuffle.

6. I would like to digress for a moment to some observations and suggestions made by the KUBARK psychological and medical staffs for the introduction of mass psychosomatic reactions through propaganda media. The most specific suggestion I recall was the distribution of propaganda describing symptoms of certain ailments and a progressive treatment of these symptoms in propaganda media inducing in the audience a psychosomatic reaction of the same symptoms and possibly even of the sicknesses. I do not recall if this suggestion was ever implemented but it is typical of the psychologist's approach to psychological warfare and deserving of further study as to the possibilities of application in a varied number of ways.

7. In fact, the psychologists or psychiatrists in the application of the principles of so-called dynamic psychiatry have been able to identify quite clearly the causes and the outside stimuli which produce psychotic, neurotic, and psychosomatic reactions. Furthermore, there is an increasing body of evidence and opinion based upon this clinical research which indicates that such reactions and that "social reactions" in terms of individual behavior within a given socio-political environment can be regulated on a mass basis and superimposed upon an entire people's mores most probably by the government of these people but also by outside pressures. Obviously, there is no laboratory or other form of experiment which has so far been devised to test such a theory. I invite your attention to the excerpts contained in Attachment A.

8. It is noteworthy that in line with this, KUGOW and KUCAGE Staffs have always espoused the concept of a psychological warfare center or workshop which could invent, initiate, test, adapt and apply successful techniques and operational patterns to designated targets in a number of geographical areas. Although never so stated, certainly one of the basic reasons why it was felt that such a workshop was needed was the need for finding some means of projecting the lessons of applied psychology and psychiatry in psychological warfare against Communism. Obviously, the clinical psychologists and the practical cold warrior were and are still many poles apart, but since each one of us practices psychology in his own small way, it is only logical that a scientific approach to psychological warfare would bring with it the determination to borrow from and use the research of the clinics.

9. Looking at the history of LCCASSOCK and the various experiments which we have run through it without the benefit of clinical research, I nevertheless find a high degree of correlation. As a preface, I would like to note that the traditional mores of the German people in the Soviet Zone have undoubtedly been influenced by the environment created by the Communist system during the past eleven years. In fact, I believe that the impact of national-socialism, although it was aligned with many of the basic traditions, also produced environmental changes in the attitudes of the entire German population and particularly so after the failure of national socialism which collapse must also have shaken long standing traditions for many Germans. While this shock in 1945 was quickly cushioned by the relatively benevolent attitude of the Western powers in what is now the Federal Republic, the turmoil, confusion and oppression in the Soviet Zone has continued unabatedly ever since.

10. The environment created by the imposition of a Communist-totalitarian-imperialist system upon a more highly civilized population and the forced regimentation of families and individuals in the Communist pattern has undoubtedly created any number of new frustrations, suppressions, repressions and other phenomena in the Soviet Zone individual. It has certainly introduced a form of "double-thinking" which precludes the simple application of psychological techniques based on studies in the free world. [] in a recent dispatch, questioned that even East German visitors to West Berlin tell the truth. I confess that I don't know but the answer can only be ascertained through questioning and testing until certain meaningful patterns emerge.

11. LCCASSOCK in its capacity as an experimental workshop attempted to identify and analyze these new factors in population attitudes and mental responses without however consciously recognizing that its approach approximated that of a psychologist with his patients. Hence you find frequent reference to Western advertising techniques and Western educational processes without the explicit corollary recognition that both of these activities are based on psychological research.

12. LCCASSOCK experimentation in the most desirable approaches to audiences such as women; youth in general, the SED, the Armed Forces, etc. have time and again demonstrated that an indirect approach designed to modify certain suppressions, projections, etc. induced in the individual by his present environment found immediate appeal. Furthermore, by experimentation, the proper grade of indirectness in the LCCASSOCK approach required to circumvent the "double-thinking" pattern is being ascertained. Other experiments with astrology, gossip and rumor have also found the target because of the inordinately strong roles played by superstition and fantasy as an escape from reality undoubtedly simply because the individual's ability to grasp and accept the realities of a Communist system were in violent conflict with his heredity and previous environmental conditioning.

13. Our exploitation of the LOUASSOCK facilities has of course not been restricted to experimentation with content, format and make-up of publications. During 1954, LOUASSOCK did an excellent job of devising and instituting test controls for hand distribution activities into the Zone. This was followed by the development of a highly professional mailing apparatus including the development of new techniques for obtaining current addresses, scrambling and mailing the letters and built-in control checks such as the reader correspondent technique. All of the conclusions gained from this experimentation have of course been utilized within other projects where necessary and feasible.

14. Last but not least, I would like to note that LOUASSOCK has developed a number of worthwhile contacts for political action as an adjunct to its primary job. These contacts are mainly in the journalistic field as far as CANNON is concerned, but by continuing indoctrination of his top staffers and free lance associates, CANNON has done much to project pro-CHURCH policy views not only into information media but also into the political institutions. CANNON through his vast acquaintanceship with the old line bureaucracy has also been able to influence the various Government agencies to a considerable extent both to LOUASSOCK's and to KIRBY's benefit.

15. I would very much appreciate a consideration of the LOUASSOCK Field Project Outline in light of the foregoing comments.

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With the relatively undeveloped state of the social sciences, another limitation arises from the fact that these sciences cannot say with any finality what data concerning a given target audience are relevant to psychological warfare planning, or how to proceed from given data to rules of action in a psywar operation. This would be a real and continuing difficulty even if there were no security cordon around Red China, even if unlimited resources were available for the collection of such data, and even if the apparatus of prediction in the social sciences were considerably more reliable than it is here assumed to be.

The basic concept underlying the present study is that of the communication process. Psychological warfare is regarded as a specialized activity in this process. In the main, a psychological warfare operation bombards its audience with written or spoken symbols, which it chooses on the basis of predictions, conscious or unconscious, in the belief that these symbols will influence certain persons' behavior and/or opinions and/or attitudes in a desired direction. It involves a communicator, an audience; it also involves the communication of a message (or messages), the reception of that message and, finally, the effects produced on the audience by that message. These five items may be regarded as the basic elements in terms of which the present study has been conducted.

Of these five elements in the psywar communications process the two most crucial ones are the audience and the effects. The psywar process is purposive: either it produces desired effects on the actual target audience, or it dissipates energies that would better be expended on some alternative weapon. In much current thinking and literature about psywar, too much attention is directed to the effects regarded in abstraction from the particular target audience. The result of this is that psywar too frequently goes after such-and-such an effect without prior inquiry into the question of whether that effect is one that could conceivably be had of the particular target audience addressed. An example of such an act would be the urging of a direct act of surrender upon a target audience located far behind the actual lines of battle. In this volume, the focus of attention will be on the relation between audience and desired effect, and the major objective through out will be to assess the behavior capabilities of the audience. The other elements of the communications process, as noted, are regarded always from the standpoint of this relation.

NOTE: CHINA: An Area Manual, Volume III Psychological warfare implications. Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University.

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